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Abstract
In this paper, the logics of the family InPk:={InP k}(n,k)∈ω2 are for-
mally defined by means of finite matrices, as a simultaneous generalization
of the weakly-intuitionistic logic I1 and of the paraconsistent logic P 1. It
is proved that this family can be naturally ordered, and it is shown an
adequate axiomatics for each logic of the form InP k.
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1 Introduction and preliminaries
The propositional logic P 1 was defined by A. Sette in [11], within the context of
a wide research about Paraconsistent Logic developed in the 70’s. It possesses
special characteristics that distinguish it from the family {Cn}{0≤n≤ω}, the
fundamental paraconsistent hierarchy (see [3]). Among other properties, even
when P 1 can be defined by means of a Hilbert-Style axiomatics, it can be also
obtained by means of a finite matrix (meanwhile no one of the Cn-logics can
be characterized in this way). The matrix semantics for P 1 is built taking as
basis a set of three truth-values: T0 and F0 (intended as the “classical truth-
values”) together with T1 (which can be associated to an “intermediate truth”).
Besides that, P 1 is maximal w.r.t to the propositional classical logic (CL), in
the sense that, if any axiom-schema (independent of the original ones) is added
to the axiomatics of P 1, then this new axiomatics generates CL. Finally, P 1 is
algebraizable, as it was shown in [6].
∗Researth supported by CICITCA - National University of San Juan.
1
As a dual counterpart of this logic, A. Sette and W. Carnielli defined in [12]
the logic I1, which, in general terms, shares with P 1 several properties among
the already mentioned (finite axiomatizability, maximality relative to CL and
algebraizability). Besides that, one of the more remarkable differences between
I1 and P 1 is the following: in P 1 is not valid the non-contradiction principle
NCP : ¬(¬φ∧φ), but it holds the middle excluded principle MEP : ¬φ∨φ. On
the other hand, I1 behaves exactly in the opposite way: it verifies NCP and it
does not verify MEP .
The logic I1 is defined by means of a 3-valued matrix, too: in this case (and
unlike P 1), the “new truth value” is F1, an “intermediate truth-value of false-
hood”. Considering this fact, it was suggested in [12] a generalization of these
logics by the addition of new intermediate truth-values, in such a way that the
“new logics” already obtained constitute a family (which could be ordered in a
natural way). Following (and simplifying at some extent) these suggestions, it
was defined in [4] the family InPk = {InP k}(n,k)∈ω2 . Every member of I
nPk
(usually mentioned here just as an InP k-logic) can be considered as a gener-
alization of I1 and of P 1 at the same time, by several reasons. First of all,
the classical logic CL can be identified simply with I0P 0. Similarly, P 1 (resp.
I1) is simply I0P 1 (resp. I1P 0). Moreover, every InP k-logic has n + k + 2
truth-values (as it will be seen later). In addition, it can be estabilished an
order relation within InPk . The logics of this family fail to verify NCP and/or
MEP (with the obvious exception of I0P 0 that satisfies both properties). It
is worth to comment that, since the InP k-logics are finite-valued, and (mostly)
paraconsistent/weakly-intuitionistic ones, they can be used as “laboratory log-
ics” in the study of several interesting properties (see [2] or [10], for example).
However, an open problem referred to this family consists of providing an ade-
quate (i.e. sound and complete) axiomatics for all the InP k-logics. This paper
is essentially devoted to offer a suitable axiomatics for them. Moreover, the
soundness and completeness theorems shown here can be considered general in
this sense: their proofs are given in such a way that the adequacity of all the
logics of InPk (w.r.t. to the axiomatics here presented) is demonstrated in a
structured mode, common to any pair (n, k) ∈ ω2 previously fixed. The tech-
nique to prove this result is adapted to the well-known Kalma´r’s method to
prove completeness for CL (see [8]).
To avoid unnecesary information or formalism, the notions to be used to prove
adequacity will be reduced as much as possible (this entails that this paper will
contain some notational abuses). Besides that, the structure of this article is as
follows: in the next section the InP k-logics will be defined by means of finite
matrices, some simple properties will be shown here, and it will be defined an
order relation in the family InPk (this justifies the expression “hierarchy” used
for this family). In addition, it will be demonstrated that In1P k1  In2P k2
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if and only if (n2, k2) ≤ (n1, k1). In Section 3, it will presented a general
axiomatics for all the InP k-logics and it will proven some properties, which are
essential to the proof of adequacity (result developed in Section 4). For that,
it is assumed that the reader is familiarized with the notions of formal proof,
schema axioms, inference rules and so on, within the context of Hilbert-Style
axiomatics. So, the definitions of these concepts (and other related ones) will
be omitted. This paper concludes with some comments about future work.
2 Semantic Presentation of the Hierarchy InPk
To define a matrix semantics for the logics of the family InPk, it is necessary to
start with the definition of the language L(C), common to all the InP k-logics:
Definition 2.1 The set of connectives of all the InP k-logics is C:={¬,→},
with obvious arities. The language L(C) (or set of formulas) for the InP k-
logics is the algebra of words generated by C over a countable set V , in the
usual way.
Along this paper, the uppercase greek letters Γ,∆,Σ . . . denote sets of formulas
of L(C). In addition, the lowercase greek letters φ, ψ, θ are metavariables
ranging over the individual formulas of L(C). Finally, the letters α, α1, α2, . . .
will be used as metavariables referred only to the atomic formulas (that is,
the elements of V). All these notations can be used with subscripts, when
neccesary. On the other hand, the expression φ[α1, . . . , αm] indicates that the
atomic formulas ocurring on φ are precisely α1, . . . , αm (this expression will be
applied in the developement of the completeness proof).
Despite their common language, the difference between each one of the InP k-
logics is given by their respective matrix semantics, defined as follows:
Definition 2.2 Let (n, k) ∈ ω2, with ω = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. The matrix M(n, k)
is defined as a pair M(n,k) = ((A(n,k), C(n,k)), D(n,k)), where:
a) (A(n,k), C(n,k)) is an algebra, similar to L(C), with support
A(n,k): = {F0, F1, · · · , Fn, T0, T1, · · ·Tk}
1
b) D(n,k) = {T0, T1, · · ·Tk}.
In addition, The operations ¬ and → of C(n,k) (also called truth-functions)
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are defined by the truth tables indicated below.
F0 Fr Ti T0
¬ T0 Fr−1 Ti−1 F0
1Every algebra (A(n,k), C(n,k)) will be identified with its support, if there is no risk of
confussion.
2Strictly speaking, the operations of C(n,k) are not the connectives of C, of course. How-
ever, they will be denoted in the same way for the sake of simplicity.
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→ F0 Fs Tj T0
F0 T0 T0 T0 T0
Fr T0 T0 T0 T0
Ti F0 F0 T0 T0
T0 F0 F0 T0 T0
With 1 ≤ r, s ≤ n; 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k .
Remark 2.3 Realize that the truth-values F1, . . . , Fn can be considered infor-
mally as intermediate values of falsehood, meanwhile T1, . . . , Tk are intermediate
values of truth. In addition, every application of ¬ to a “non classical value”,
approximates more and more the value to the “classical ones”, F0 and T0. Note
that there are needed n negations at most to pass from Fr to F0. Similarly,
the values of the form Ti “become” T0 after k negations at most. On the other
hand, the implication → cannot distinguish between classical or intermediate
truth-values: it just considers every value of the form Fi as being F0, and every
value of the form Tj as being T0.
Taking into account the previous truth-tables, some secondary (and useful)
truth-functions can be defined. As a motivation, it would be desirable that
disjunction (∨) and conjunction (∧) behave as → in this aspect: they cannot
distinguish classical from intermediate truth-values. For that, it is taken as
starting point the unary function of “classicalization” c© (the meaning of this
neologism is obvious), defined by c©(A) := (A→ A)→ A, for every A ∈ A(n,k).
So, the truth-table associated to it is
T0 Ti Fr F0
c© T0 T0 F0 F0
From c© it is defined the truth-function ∼, of strong (also called classical) nega-
tion, as ∼ A : = ¬( c©A). So, its associated truth-table is
F0 Fr Ti T0
∼ T0 T0 F0 F0
It is possible to define ∨ and ∧ now, adapting the usual definition for CL:
A ∨ B:= ∼ A → B, meanwhile A ∧ B:= ∼ (A →∼ B). For these connectives,
their associated truth-functions are:
∨ F0 Fs Tj T0
F0 F0 T0 T0 T0
Fr F0 F0 T0 T0
Ti T0 T0 T0 T0
T0 T0 T0 T0 T0
∧ F0 Fs Tj T0
F0 F0 F0 F0 F0
Fr F0 F0 F0 F0
Ti F0 F0 T0 T0
T0 F0 F0 T0 T0
4
With 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k; 1 ≤ r, s ≤ n.
From the previous definitions, it is clear that all the binary truth-functions
consider all the non-designated values Fj as behaving as F0, and similarly for
all the values Ti. The same fact holds for ∼. In the case of ¬, however, all
the truth-values can be differentiated. This is the main difference of ¬ and ∼,
and justifies the definition and the study of the InP k-logics. For example, when
n ≥ 1, MEP : ¬φ ∨ φ it is not an InP k-tautology (it is enough to consider a
valuation v such that v(A) = Ti with i ≥ 1), meanwhile this principle is valid
if ¬ is replaced by ∼. That is, |=(n,k)∼ φ ∨ φ for any I
nP k-logic. In a dual
way, when k ≥ 1, ∼ (∼ φ ∧ φ) is a InP k-tautology. (for every (n, k) ∈ ω2), but
¬(¬φ ∧ φ) is not valid in all the InP k-logics. Indeed, ¬(¬φ ∧ φ) is only valid in
the InP 0-logics.
After a deeper analysis it is possible to see that, given a fixed logic InP k,
|=(n,k) ¬φ ∨ φ iff φ = ¬
t(φ → θ) (with t ≥ 0), or φ = ¬tα, with α ∈ V , with
t ≥ n: otherwise (when φ = ¬tα with t < n) 6|=(n,k) ¬φ ∨ φ. In a similar
way, |=(n,k) ¬(¬φ ∧ φ) iff φ = ¬
t(ψ → θ) with t ≥ 0, or φ = ¬tα, with t ≥ k,
α ∈ V . From these comments can see that NCP and MEP are not valid in
general terms. So, it is natural to distinguish between “well-behaved” formulas
and “not well-behaved” ones (with respect to each of the mentioned principles).
This distinction is formalized with the unary “well-behavior” truth-functions,
defined in the obvious way: A∗:= ¬A∨A; A◦:= ¬(¬A∧A), for every A ∈ A(n,k).
Its respective truth-tables are
F0 Fr Ti T0
∗ T0 F0 T0 T0
F0 Fr Ti T0
◦ T0 T0 F0 T0
Besides the behavior of the truth-function in each matrix M(n,k), recall that its
definition is motivated by the definition of a consequence relation on L(C) (and
therefore of a logic), in the usual way:
Definition 2.4 AnM(n,k)-valuation is any homomorphism v : L(C)→ A(n,k)
(this notion makes sense because L(C) and A(n,k) are similar algebras). Re-
call here that every M(n,k)-valuation can be defined just considering functions
v : V → A(n,k) and extending it to all L(C). The logic I
nP k is the pair
InP k:=(C, |=(n,k)), being |=(n,k)⊆ ℘(L(C))×L(C) defined as usual: Γ |=(n,k) φ
iff, for very M(n,k)-valuation v, v(Γ) ⊆ D(n,k) implies v(φ) ∈ D(n,k). In this
context, φ is an InP k-tautology iff ∅ |=(n,k) φ (this fact will be denoted by
|=(n,k) φ, as usual). The family {I
nP k}(n,k)∈ω2 will be denoted by I
nPk.
Remark 2.5 The family InPk. includes some well-known logics. Indeed, I0P 0
is just the classical logic CL. On the other hand, the logic I1P 0 is I1 indeed
meanwhile I0P 1 is just P 1. In addition, all the InP k-logics can be “naturally
ordered”, taking into account the following definition:
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Definition 2.6 The order relation  ⊆ (InPk)2 is defined in the following
natural way: In1P k1  In2P k2 iff, for every Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L(C), Γ |=(n1,k1) φ
implies Γ |=(n2,k2) φ.
Taking into account the previous definition, it is natural to visualize (InPk,)
as a lattice:
Proposition 2.7 In the logic InP k (n, k fixed), the following formulas are
tautologies:
a) ¬n+1φ ∨ ¬nφ ((n+ 1)-generalization of MEP .)
b) ¬(¬k+1φ ∧ ¬kφ) ((k + 1)-generalization of NCP ).
Proposition 2.8 In1P k1  In2P k2 iff (n2, k2) ≤Π (n1, k1) (being ≤Π the order
of the product on ω2). Therefore, the Hierarchy (InPk,) is a lattice.
Proof: If (n2, k2) ≤Π (n1, k1), then A(n2,k2) ⊆ A(n1,k1), andD(n2,k2) ⊆ D(n1,k1).
Now suppose that Γ0 6|=(n2,k2) φ0 for some Γ0 ∪ {φ0} ⊆ L(C). So, there exists a
valuation v : V → A(n2,k2) such that v(Γ0) ⊆ D(n2,k2), v(φ0) /∈ D(n2,k2). Define
the valuation w : V → A(n1,k1) as w(α) = v(α), for every α ∈ V . It can be proved
that, for every ψ ∈ L(C), w(ψ) = v(ψ). Thus, w(Γ0) ⊆ D(n2,k2) ⊆ D(n1,k1) and
w(φ0) ∈ {F0, . . . , Fn2} ⊆ {F0, . . . , Fn1}. That is, Γ0 6|=(n1,k1) φ0. The previous
argument shows that In1P k1  In2P k2 .
For the converse, suppose (n2, k2) 6≤Π (n1, k1). There are two cases that
must be analyzed in different ways. First, if n2 > n1 consider any formula φ1:=
¬n1+1α∨¬n1α, with α ∈ V . So, |=(n1,k1) φ1, by Prop. 2.7.a). Now, defining the
valuation v1 : V → A(n2,k2) by v1(α):=Fn2 , it holds v1(φ1) = ¬
n1+1Fn2∨¬
n1Fn2
= Fn2−(n1+1)∨Fn2−n1 = F0 (since n1+1 ≤ n2). Thus, 6|=(n2,k2) φ1. On the other
hand, if k2 > k1, let φ2:=¬(¬
k1+1α ∧ ¬k1α). As in the first case, |=(n1,k1) φ2,
by Prop. 2.7.b). Now, if it is defined the valuation v2 : V → A(n2,k2) such
that v2(α) = Tk2 , then 6|=(n1,k1) φ2 (note here that k1 + 1 ≤ k2). So, for both
possibilities it holds In1P k1 6 In2P k2 . This concludes the proof. ✷
Some consequences of the previous result, useful to visualize  (actually, its
underlying strict order ≺) are the following:
Corollary 2.9 In InP k it holds that:
a) In+1P k ≺ InP k.
b) InP k+1 ≺ InP k.
c) InP k+1 and In+1P k are not comparables.
This section concludes with the mention of the following result that will be
applied at the end of this paper:
Proposition 2.10 The consequence relation |=(n,k) verifies:
a) Γ |=(n,k) φ implies Γ ∪ {ψ} |=(n,k) φ [Monotonicity]
b) Γ, φ |=(n,k) ψ iff Γ |=(n,k) φ→ ψ [Semantic Deduction Theorem]
c) If Γ |=(n,k) φ, then Γ
′ |=(n,k) φ for some finite set Γ
′ ⊆ Γ [Finitariness]
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Proof: Obviously, it is holds a). The claim b) arises from the truth-table of
→. With respect to c), |=(n,k) is finitary because is naturally defined by means
of a single finite matrix (result indebted to R. Wo´jcicki: see [13]). ✷
3 A Hilbert-Style Axiomatics for the InP k-logics
From now on, consider an InP k-logic fixed, with (n, k) ∈ ω2. To obtain the de-
sired axiomatics, the secondary truth-functions∼, c©, ∨ and ∧ from the previous
section will be reflected by means of the definition of secondary connectives in
L(C). Formally:
Definition 3.1 The secondary connectives ∼, c©, ∨, ∧ are defined in L(C) in
the following way:
c©φ:= (φ→ φ)→ φ
∼ φ:= ¬( c©φ)
φ ∨ ψ:= ∼ φ→ ψ
φ ∧ ψ:= ∼ (φ→∼ ψ).
φ∗:= ¬φ ∨ φ
φ◦:= ¬(¬φ ∧ φ)
In addition, the conncectives ∨CL and ∧CL are defined by:
φ ∨CL ψ:= ¬φ→ ψ
φ ∧CL ψ:= ¬(φ→ ¬ψ)
3.
Finally, the expression ¬qφ indicates ¬(. . . (¬φ)) . . . ), q times. ¬0φ is merely φ.
Taking into account the previous conventions, the axiomatics for the InP k-logics
will be presented in the sequel. For that consider, from now on, an arbitrary
(fixed) pair (n, k) ∈ ω2.
Definition 3.2 The consequence relation ⊢(n,k) ⊆ ℘(L(C)) × L(C) is de-
fined by means of the following Hilbert-Style axiomatics, considering these
schema axioms:
Ax1 φ→ (ψ → φ)
Ax2 (φ→ (ψ → θ))→ ((φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ θ))
Ax3 (φ→ ψ)∗
Ax4 (φ→ ψ)◦
Ax5 (¬nφ)∗
Ax6 (¬kφ)◦
Ax7 φ
∗ → [ψ◦ → ((¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬φ→ ψ)→ φ))]
Ax8 φ
∗ → [ψ◦ → ((φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((φ→ ψ)→ ¬φ))]
Ax9 φ
∗ → (¬¬φ→ φ)
Ax10 φ
◦ → (φ→ ¬¬φ)
Ax11 φ
∗ → (¬φ)∗
3The “classical” connectives ∧CL and ∨CL are not essential in the proof of Completeness.
However, they are indicated here for a better explanation of the comparison between these
connectives w.r.t ∧ and ∨, as it will be remarked later.
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Ax12 φ
◦ → (¬φ)◦
The only inference rule for this axiomatics is
Modus Ponens (MP): φ, φ→ ψ
ψ
.
From this definition, the well-known notions of formal proof (with or without
hypotheses), formal theorem, etc. are the usual. Because of this, ⊢(n,k) is
monotonic: Γ ⊢(n,k) φ implies Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊢(n,k) φ. This fact will be widely used.
Remark 3.3 It is well known that the inclusion of Ax1, Ax2 and MP entail
that it is valid ⊢(n,k) φ→ φ. Moreover:
Theorem 3.4 ⊢(n,k) satisfies the (syntactic) Deduction Theorem (DT). That
is, Γ, φ ⊢(n,k) ψ iff Γ ⊢(n,k) φ→ ψ.
Proof: This result holds because the inclusion of axioms Ax1 and Ax2 too, and
considering that the only (primitive) inference rule is Modus Ponens. See [8] for
a detailed proof. ✷
Ax1 and Ax2 allow to obtain some useful rules in relation to ⊢(n,k), too:
Proposition 3.5 Given the logic InP k, the following secondary rules are valid:
Permutation (Perm): φ→ (ψ → θ)
ψ → (φ→ θ)
.
Transitivity (Trans): φ→ ψ, ψ → θ
φ→ θ
.
Reduction (Red): (φ→ ψ)→ θ
ψ → θ
.
The following two results involve formulas of the form φ∗ or φ◦:
Proposition 3.6 For every φ ∈ L(C), for every (n, k) ∈ ω2, it holds:
⊢(n,k) (φ
∗)∗; ⊢(n,k) (φ
∗)◦; ⊢(n,k) ( c©φ)
∗; ⊢(n,k) ( c©φ)
◦.
This result is valid since φ∗:= ∼ (¬φ) → φ and c©φ = (φ → φ) → φ, and
considering axioms Ax3 and Ax4 from Definition 3.2.
Proposition 3.7 If |=(n,k) φ, then ⊢(n,k) φ
∗ and ⊢(n,k) φ
◦.
Proof: If |=(n,k) φ then (checking the truth-tables of I
nP k) φ is necessarily of
the form ¬q(ψ → θ), with q ≥ 0. From this, apply Ax3, Ax4 (and, eventually,
Ax11 and Ax12). ✷
The next result shows some basic InP k-theorems:
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Proposition 3.8 The following formulas of L(C) are theorems w.r.t. ⊢(n,k) :
a) φ→ c©φ; a’) c©φ→ φ
b) φ∗ → (∼ φ→ ¬φ)
c) φ∗ → [ψ◦ → ((¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ (ψ → φ))]
d) φ∗ → [ψ◦ → ((φ→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬φ))]
e) (∼ φ→∼ ψ)→ ((∼ φ→ c©ψ)→ c©φ)
f) (∼ φ→∼ ψ)→ ((∼ φ→ ψ)→ φ))
Proof: The following are schematic formal proofs (in the context of ⊢(n,k)) for
every formula above indicated. Sometimes it will be applied Theorem 3.4 or
Proposition 3.5 without explicit mention.
For a): φ → c©φ = φ → ((φ → φ) → φ) is a particular case of Ax1. For the
case of a’):
1) (φ→ φ)→ φ [Hyp.; Def. c©φ]
2) φ→ φ [Remark 3.3]
3) φ [1), 2), MP]
So, it is valid c©φ ⊢(n,k) φ.
For b):
1) φ∗ [Hyp.]
2) ( c©φ)◦ [Prop. 3.6]
3) φ∗ → [ ( c©φ)◦ → ((φ→∼ φ)→ ((φ→ c©φ)→ ¬φ)] [Ax8, Def. 3.1 (of ∼)]
4) (φ→∼ φ)→ ((φ→ c©φ)→ ¬φ) [1), 2), 3), MP ]
5) (φ→ c©φ)→ ((φ→∼ φ)→ ¬φ) [4), Perm.]
6) φ→ c©φ [a)]
7) (φ→∼ φ)→ ¬φ [5), 6), MP]
8) ∼ φ→ (φ→∼ φ) [Ax1 ]
9) ∼ φ→ ¬φ [7), 8), Trans.]
That is, φ∗ ⊢(n,k)∼ φ→ ¬φ.
For c):
1) φ∗ [Hyp.]
2) ψ◦ [Hyp.]
3) ¬φ→ ¬ψ [Hyp.]
4) ψ [Hyp.]
5) ψ → (¬φ→ ψ) [Ax1]
6) ¬φ→ ψ [4), 5), MP]
7) φ∗ → [ψ◦ → ((¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬φ→ ψ)→ φ))] [Ax7]
8) (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬φ→ ψ)→ φ) [7), 1), 2), MP]
9) (¬φ→ ψ)→ φ [8), 3), MP]
10) φ [9), 6), MP]
Thus, φ∗, ψ◦,¬φ→ ¬ψ, ψ ⊢(n,k) φ.
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For d): adapt the proof of c), using Ax8 instead of Ax7. Then, it will be valid
φ∗, ψ◦, φ→ ψ,¬ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬φ.
For e):
1) ( c©φ)∗ [Prop. 3.6 ]
2) ( c©ψ)◦ [Prop. 3.6]
3) ( c©φ)∗ → [( c©ψ)◦ → ((∼ φ→∼ ψ)→ ((∼ φ→ c©ψ)→ c©φ))]
[Def. 3.1 (of ∼), Ax7.]
4) (∼ φ→∼ ψ)→ ((∼ φ→ c©ψ)→ c©φ) [1), 2), 3), MP]
So, ⊢(n,k) (∼ φ→∼ ψ)→ ((∼ φ→ c©ψ)→ c©φ).
For f):
1) ∼ φ→∼ ψ [Hyp.]
2) ∼ φ→ ψ [Hyp.]
3) ψ → c©ψ [a)]
4) ∼ φ→ c©ψ [2), 3), Trans.]
5) (∼ φ→∼ ψ)→ ((∼ φ→ c©ψ)→ c©φ)) [e)]
6) c©φ [1), 4), 5), MP]
7) c©φ→ φ [a’)]
8) φ [6), 7), MP]
From all this, ∼ φ →∼ ψ,∼ φ → ψ ⊢(n,k) ψ. Now, apply Theorem 3.4, as in
the previous results. This concludes the proof. ✷
Remark 3.9 Now is convenient to relate the axiomatics given in Definition
3.2 with a well-known axiomatics for CL = I0P 0. According [8], CL can be
axiomatized by MP joined with the following three schema axioms:
Bx1 = Ax1
Bx2 = Ax2
Bx3 = (¬φ→ ¬ψ)→ ((¬φ→ ψ)→ φ).
Note that, cf. Definition 3.2, fixed an arbitrary consequence relation ⊢(n,k), the
axiom Bx3 of the previous axiomatics is replaced by a weaker version (Ax7).
Anyway, since in the particular case of ⊢(0,0), axioms Ax5 and Ax6 establish
that, for every formula φ ∈ L(C), ⊢(0,0) φ
∗ and ⊢(0,0) φ
◦, it is possible to recover
the axiomatics determined by Bx1, Bx2 and Bx3, actually. Moreover:
Proposition 3.10 Let φ ∈ L(C), in such a way that φ is a formal theorem
of CL (that is, ⊢(0,0) φ), and let φ
′ ∈ L(C), obtained by φ replacing all the
ocurrences of the symbol ¬ in φ by ∼. Then ⊢(n,k) φ
′.
Proof: Consider the axiomatics for I0P 0 indicated in Remark 3.9, and compare
it with the general axiomatics given in Definition 3.2. First of all note that
neither Bx1 (= Ax1) nor Bx2 (= Ax2) have ocurrences of ¬. Besides, since
Bx3=(¬φ → ¬ψ) → ((¬φ → ψ) → φ)), and considering Prop. 3.8.f), it holds
⊢(n,k) (∼ φ→∼ ψ)→ ((∼ φ→ ψ)→ φ) ( = Bx3
′). From these facts, it can be
easily proved by induction of the lenght of the formal proof of φ (w.r.t ⊢(0,0))
that ⊢(0,0) φ implies ⊢(n,k) φ
′. ✷
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Corollary 3.11 Suppose φ ∈ L(C), and let the formula φ′′ ∈ L(C) built by φ
replacing the eventual ocurrences of ¬ in φ by ∼, and replacing every ocurrence
of ∨CPL (resp. ∧CPL), understood as an abbreviation (cf. Definition 3.1), by
∨ (resp. ∧). Then, ⊢(0,0) φ implies ⊢(n,k) φ
′′.
For instance, since ⊢(0,0) ¬φ ∨CL φ, then ⊢(n,k)∼ φ ∨ φ. However, it is not
generally valid that ⊢(n,k) ¬φ ∨CL φ, obviously. The next result collects some
particular cases of the previous corollary:
Corollary 3.12 The relation ⊢(n,k) verifies, given (n, k) ∈ ω
2:
a) ⊢(n,k) φ→ φ ∨ ψ; a’) ⊢(n,k) ψ → φ ∨ ψ
b) ⊢(n,k) φ ∧ ψ → φ; b’) ⊢(n,k) φ ∧ ψ → ψ
c) ⊢(n,k) (φ→ θ)→ ((ψ → θ)→ (φ ∨ ψ → θ))
d) ⊢(n,k) φ→ (ψ → (φ ∧ ψ)).
e) ⊢(n,k) φ ∧ ψ → φ ∨ ψ.
Finally, to prove Completeness, it will be necessary:
Proposition 3.13 The following are InP k-theorems:
a) φ→ φ∗
b) φ◦ → (¬φ→ (φ→ ψ))
c) (φ◦)◦
d) ¬(φ∗)→ φ◦
e) ∼ φ→ φ◦
f) φ∗ → (¬(φ ∨ ψ)→ ¬φ)
g) ψ◦ → (φ→ (¬ψ → ¬(φ→ ψ)))
h) (¬(φ→ ψ))∗; (¬(φ→ ψ))◦
i) (¬(φ∗))◦
j) ¬(φ∗)→ (φ→ ψ)
Proof: these formal theorems are formally demonstrated as in Proposition 3.8,
applying DT and Proposition 3.5 if were necessary:
For a): taking into account Corollary 3.12.a’), it is valid ⊢(n,k) φ → ¬φ ∨ φ.
That is, ⊢(n,k) φ→ φ
∗.
For b):
1) φ◦ [Hyp.]
2) ¬φ [Hyp.]
3) (¬φ→ ψ)∗ [Ax3]
4) (¬φ→ ψ)∗ → [φ◦ → ((¬(¬φ→ ψ)→ ¬φ)→ (φ→ (¬φ→ ψ)))]
[Prop. 3.8.c)]
5) (¬(¬φ→ ψ)→ ¬φ)→ (φ→ (¬φ→ ψ)) [1), 3), 4), MP]
6) ¬φ→ (¬(¬φ→ ψ)→ ¬φ) [Ax1]
7) ¬(¬φ→ ψ)→ ¬φ [2), 6), MP]
8) φ→ (¬φ→ ψ) [5), 7),MP]
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9) ¬φ→ (φ→ ψ) [8), Perm.]
10) φ→ ψ [2), 9), MP]
Thus, it holds φ◦ ⊢(n,k) ¬φ→ (φ→ ψ), as was desired.
For c):
1) ( c©(¬φ→∼ φ))◦ [Prop. 3.6]
2) (∼ (¬φ→∼ φ))◦ [1), Ax12]
3) (¬φ ∧ φ)◦ [2), Def. 3.1 (of ∧)]
4) (¬(¬φ ∧ φ))◦ [3), Ax12]
5) (φ◦)◦ [4), Def. 3.1 (of ◦)]
For d):
1) (φ∗)◦ [Prop. 3.6]
2) ( c©(¬φ→∼ φ))∗ [Prop. 3.6]
3) (¬φ ∧ φ)∗ [2), Def. 3.1 (of ∧), Ax11]
4) (¬φ ∧ φ)∗ → [(φ∗)◦ → ((¬φ ∧ φ→ φ∗)→ ((¬(φ∗)→ φ◦))] [Prop. 3.8.d)]
5) (¬φ ∧ φ→ ¬φ ∨ φ)→ ((¬(φ∗)→ φ◦) [1), 3), 4), MP]
6) ¬φ ∧ φ→ ¬φ ∨ φ [Corollary 3.12.e)]
7) ¬(φ∗)→ φ◦ [5), 6), MP]
So, ⊢(n,k) ¬(φ
∗)→ φ◦
For e):
1) (¬φ ∧ φ)∗ → [( c©φ)◦ → ((¬φ ∧ φ→ c©φ)→ (∼ φ→ φ◦))]
[Prop. 3.8.d), Def. 3.1 (of ∼ and ◦)]
2) ¬φ ∧ φ→ φ [Corollary 3.12.b’)]
3) φ→ c©φ [Prop. 3.8.a)]
4) ¬φ ∧ φ→ c©φ [2), 3), Trans.]
5) ( c©φ)◦ [Prop. 3.6]
6) ( c©(¬φ→∼ φ))∗ [Prop. 3.6]
7) (∼ (¬φ→∼ φ))∗ [6), Def. 3.1 (of ∼), Ax11]
8) (¬φ ∧ φ)∗ [7), Def. 3.1 (of ∧)]
9) ∼ φ→ φ◦ [1), 4), 5), 8), MP]
Therefore, ⊢(n,k)∼ φ→ φ
◦
For f):
1) φ∗ [Hyp.]
2) (φ ∨ ψ)◦ [Ax4, Def. 3.1 (of ∨)]
3) φ∗ → [(φ ∨ ψ)◦ → ((φ→ φ ∨ ψ)→ (¬(φ ∨ ψ)→ ¬φ)] [Prop. 3.8.d)]
4) (φ→ φ ∨ ψ)→ (¬(φ ∨ ψ)→ ¬φ) [1), 2), 3), MP]
5) φ→ φ ∨ ψ [Corollary 3.12.a)]
6) ¬(φ ∨ ψ)→ ¬φ [4), 5), MP]
Thus, φ∗ ⊢(n,k) ¬(φ ∨ ψ)→ ¬φ.
For g):
1) ψ◦ [Hyp.]
2) (φ→ ψ)∗ [Ax3]
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3) (φ→ ψ)∗ → [ψ◦ → (((φ→ ψ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬(φ→ ψ)))] [Prop. 3.8.d)]
4) ((φ→ ψ)→ ψ)→ (¬ψ → ¬(φ→ ψ)) [1), 2), 3), MP]
5) (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ) [Remark 3.3]
6) φ→ ((φ→ ψ)→ ψ) [5), Perm.]
7) φ→ (¬ψ → (φ→ ψ)) [4), 6), Trans.]
So, ψ◦ ⊢(n,k) φ→ (¬ψ → ¬(φ→ ψ)) is obtained.
For h): By Ax3 and Ax11 it holds ⊢(n,k) (¬(φ → ψ))
∗; By Ax4 and Ax12 it
holds ⊢(n,k) (¬(φ→ ψ))
◦.
For i): It is a particular case of h).
For j):
1) ¬(φ∗) [Hyp.]
2) φ [Hyp.]
3) φ→ φ∗ [a)]
4) φ∗ [2), 3), MP]
5) (φ∗)◦ [Prop. 3.6 ]
6) (φ∗)◦ → (¬(φ∗)→ (φ∗ → ψ)) [b)]
7) ψ [1), 4), 5). 6), MP]
That is, it holds ¬(φ∗), φ ⊢(n,k) ψ. Then, apply Theorem 3.4. This last result
completes the proof. ✷
4 General Soundness and Completeness
It is easy to check that the axioms given in Definition 3.2 are InP k-tautologies.
So, taking into account that MP preserves InP k-tautologies, it holds:
Theorem 4.1 [Weak Soundness] If ⊢(n,k) φ, then |=(n,k) φ.
A theorem of (weak) Completeness arises as an adaptation of the well-known
Kalma´r’s proof for Classical Logic CL, cf. [8]:
Definition 4.2 For every formula φ[α1, α2, . . . , αm] ∈ L(C), for every InP k-
valuation v, for every atomic formula αp (1 ≤ p ≤ m) letQvp be the set associated
to αp and to v, defined by:
• If v(αp) = Fr (with 1 ≤ r ≤ n), then:
Qvp = {¬(αp
∗),¬((¬αp)∗), . . . ,¬((¬r−1αp)∗), (¬rαp)∗}
• If v(αp) = Ti (with 1 ≤ i ≤ k), then:
Qvp = {¬αp ∧ αp,¬
2αp ∧ ¬αp, . . . ,¬iαp ∧ ¬i−1αp, (¬iαp)◦}
• If v(αp) = F0, then Qvp= {∼ αp, (αp)
∗}
• If v(αp) = T0, then Qvp = { c©αp, (αp)
◦}
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In addition, let the set ∆vφ:= Q
v
1 ∪Q
v
2 , · · · ∪Q
v
m.
On the other hand, for every InP k-valuation v indicated above, the formula
φv (determined by φ and v) is defined as follows:
• If v(φ) = Fr (with 0 ≤ r ≤ n), then φ
v = ¬r+1φ.
• If v(φ) = Ti (with 0 ≤ i ≤ k), then φv = φ.
For the next technical (and essential) result, the following obvious fact will
be applied without explicit mention: according to the previous definition, if
φ ∈ L(C) and ψ is a subformula of φ then, for every valuation v, ∆vψ ⊆ ∆
v
φ.
Bearing this in mind it is possible to demonstrate:
Lemma 4.3 For every formula φ=φ[α1, . . . , αm] ∈ L(C), for every InP k-va-
luation v, it holds that ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) φ
v.
Proof: By induction on the complexity of φ. The analysis is divided in the
following cases:
Case 1): φ ∈ V (without losing generality, φ = α1, which implies ∆vφ = Q
v
1).
Then:
If v(φ) = F0, then φ
v = ¬φ and ∆vφ = {∼ φ, φ
∗}. So, ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) φ
v by Prop.
3.8.b).
If v(φ) = Fr (1 ≤ r ≤ n), then φv = ¬r+1φ and {(¬rφ)∗,¬(¬rφ∨¬r−1φ)} ⊆ ∆vφ.
Now, by Prop. 3.13.f), ⊢(n,k) (¬
rφ)∗ → (¬(¬rφ ∨ ¬r−1φ) → ¬r+1φ). From all
this, ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) ¬
r+1φ (= φv).
If v(φ) = Ti (1 ≤ i ≤ k), then ¬φ ∧ φ ∈ ∆
v
φ. By Corollary 3.12.b’), ∆
v
φ ⊢(n,k) φ
(=φt).
If v(φ) = T0, then ∆
t
φ = { c©φ, (φ)
◦}. Thus, ∆tφ ⊢(n,k) c©φ ( = (φ→ φ)→ φ)).
So, since ⊢(n,k) φ → φ, it holds ∆
t
φ ⊢(n,k) φ (= φ
t). The proof of Case 1) is
completed.
Case 2): when φ is of the form ¬ψ. Consider the following subcases:
2.1): v(ψ) = F0. By (I.H), ∆
v
ψ ⊢(n,k) ψ
v (= ¬ψ = φv). Hence, ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) φ
v.
2.2): v(ψ) = Fr, with 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Note that v(φ) = Fr−1, which implies φv =
¬rφ = ¬r+1ψ = ψv. So, ∆φ ⊢(n,k) φ
v, by (I.H).
2.3): v(ψ) = T1. From Definition 2.2, ψ = ¬
q−1α, with 1 ≤ q ≤ k, α ∈ V , and
v(α) = Tq. Thus, ∆
v
ψ = Q
v
α = {(¬α ∧ α), . . . , (¬
qα ∧ ¬q−1α), (¬qα)◦}. From
this, using Corollary 3.12.b), it holds ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) ¬
qα (=φv).
2.4): v(ψ) = Ti, with 2 ≤ i ≤ k. So, v(φ) = Ti−1, 1 ≤ i − 1 ≤ k − 1. In
addition, ψ = ¬qα, with 0 ≤ q ≤ k− i, v(α) = Ti+q and α ∈ V From this, φ∧ψ
= ¬q+1α ∧ ¬qα ∈ Qvα = ∆
v
ψ = ∆
v
φ (since q + 1 ≤ k). So, applying Corollary
3.12.b), ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) φ = φ
v.
2.5): v(ψ) = T0. Then, v(φ) = F0. To prove that ∆
v
φ ⊢(n,k) ¬φ (= ¬¬ψ) it
suffices to demonstrate ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) ψ
◦ (⋆). Indeed, if this fact holds, from Ax10,
then it would be verified ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) ψ → ¬¬ψ. And, since it holds ∆
v
ψ ⊢(n,k) ψ
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(by (I.H)), it will be obtained ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) φ
v. Now, to prove (⋆), consider the
following possibilities:
2.5.1): ψ is of the form ¬q(θ1 → θ2) (with 0 ≤ q). Applying Ax4 and (eventu-
ally) Ax12, it holds ⊢(n,k) ψ
◦, and therefore ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) ψ
◦.
2.5.2): ψ is of the form ¬qα, α ∈ V , 0 ≤ q. In this case, Qvα = ∆
v
ψ. Consider
here the different possibilities for v(α):
2.5.2.1): v(α) = F0. Then, ∆
v
α = {∼ α, α
∗}. By Prop. 3.13.e), ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) α
◦.
Then, apply Ax12 (q times).
2.5.2.2): v(α) = Fr (with 1 ≤ r ≤ n). Since ¬(α∗) ∈ ∆vα, it holds ∆
v
α ⊢(n,k) α
◦,
because Prop. 3.13.d). From this, ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) ψ
◦, by Ax12 again.
2.5.2.3): v(α) = Ti (with 1 ≤ i ≤ k). So, i ≤ q (in fact: if i > q, then v(ψ)
= Ti−q, i − q ≥ 1, contradicting v(ψ) = T0). Besides, note that (¬iα)◦ ∈ ∆vα,
which implies ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) (¬
iα)◦. So, since i ≤ q, ∆ψ ⊢(n,k)) (ψ)
◦, again by Ax12.
2.5.2.4): v(α) = T0. Then, ∆
v
ψ ⊢(n,k) α
◦, since α◦ ∈ Qvα ⊆ ∆
v
ψ . Then, applying
Ax12 one more time, (⋆) is valid. The proof of Case 2) is concluded.
Case 3): φ is of the form ψ → θ. There exist the following possibilities 4 :
3.1): v(ψ) = F0 (and so, φ
v = ψ → θ). By (I.H), ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) ¬ψ (⋆). In addition,
it can be proved that ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) ψ
◦ (⋆⋆) (such a proof runs as follows, according
the internal structure of ψ):
3.1.1): ψ = α ∈ V . So, ∆vψ ⊢(n,k)∼ ψ. Applying Prop. 3.13.e), it holds (⋆⋆).
3.1.2): ψ = ¬qα, 1 ≤ q, α ∈ V . Consider the following possibilities for v(α):
3.1.2.1): v(α) = F0. Then, by Prop. 3.13.e), Q
v
α ⊢(n,k) α
◦ .
3.1.2.2): v(α) = Fr (1 ≤ r ≤ n). Then, q ≥ r (because q < r implies v(ψ) =
v(¬qα) = ¬q(v(α)) = Fr−q 6= F0, which is absurd). Besides that, ¬((¬r−1α)∗) ∈
Qvα. Therefore Q
v
α ⊢(n,k) (¬
r−1α)◦, because Prop. 3.13.d).
3.1.2.3): v(α) = Ti (1 ≤ i ≤ k). So, q ≥ i (by similar reasons to 3.1.3.2)). In
addition, (¬iα)◦ ∈ Qvα, and so Q
v
α ⊢(n,k) (¬
iα)◦.
3.1.2.4): v(α) = T0. Obviously, Q
v
α ⊢(n,k) (α)
◦, from Def. 4.2.
Now note that Ax12 can be applied in all the subcases 3.1.2.1)-3.1.2.4), in such
a way to obtain ∆vψ ⊢(n,k) ψ
◦, completing the proof (⋆⋆) for Subcase 3.1.2).
3.1.3): ψ = ¬q(θ1 → θ2), with 0 ≤ q. By Ax3, ⊢(n,k) (θ1 → θ2)
◦. Now, apply
Ax12, q times.
So, it was proven (⋆⋆) for all the possibilities of Subcase 3.1. From this, (⋆) and
Prop. 3.13.b), it holds ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) ψ → θ (=φ
v).
3.2): v(ψ) = Fr, 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Again, v(φ) = T0 and so φv = ψ → θ. Note
that, since v(ψ) = Fr, ψ = ¬
qα, with q ≥ 0, α ∈ V . Thus, v(α) = Fr+q, with
r+q ≤ n, which implies Qvα = {¬(α
∗),¬((¬α)∗), . . . ,¬((¬r+q−1α)∗), (¬r+qα)∗}.
So, ¬((¬qα)∗) ∈ Qvα, because r ≥ 1. Thus, ∆
v
φ ⊢(n,k) ¬(ψ
∗). From this and
Prop. 3.13.j), ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) φ
v.
3.3): v(θ) = Ti, 0 ≤ i ≤ k. So, φv = ψ → θ one more time. By (I.H), ∆vθ ⊢(n,k) θ.
Now apply Ax1.
4The first three subcases indicate the possibilities for v(φ) = T0. The last two cases
correspond to v(φ) = F0.
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3.4): v(ψ) = Ti, v(θ) = Fr (0 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ r ≤ n). Using (I.H), ∆φ ⊢(n,k) ψ,
which implies ∆φ ⊢(n,k) (ψ → θ) → θ, because ⊢(n,k) ψ → ((ψ → θ) → θ).
Hence, ∆φ ⊢(n,k) (ψ → θ) → θ
∗, by Prop. 3.13.a). Now, considering that
∆vφ ⊢(n,k) (ψ → θ)
∗ and ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) (θ
∗)◦ (because Ax3 and Prop. 3.6, resp.), it is
valid that ∆φ ⊢(n,k) ¬(θ
∗)→ ¬(ψ → θ), by Prop. 3.8.d). In addition, reasoning
as in Subcase 3.2) (w.r.t θ), ∆φ ⊢(n,k) ¬(θ)
∗. Thus, ∆φ ⊢(n,k) ¬(ψ → θ) (= φ
v),
as it is desired.
3.5): v(ψ) = Ti (0 ≤ i ≤ k), v(θ) = F0. Adapting (⋆⋆) of Subcase 3.1) to θ it can
be obtained ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) θ
◦. Besides that, by (I.H), ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) ψ and ∆
v
φ ⊢(n,k) ¬θ.
Considering Prop. 3.13.g) now, it holds ∆vφ ⊢(n,k) ¬(ψ → θ) = φ
v.
The analysis of this last subcase finishes the proof. ✷
Lemma 4.4 Let ∆ ∪ {ψ, θ} be a subset of L(C). If the following n + k + 4
syntactic consequences are valid:
1) ∆,¬(ψ∗), (¬ψ)∗ ⊢(n,k) θ
2) ∆,¬(ψ∗),¬((¬ψ)∗), (¬2ψ)∗ ⊢(n,k) θ
...
...
n− 1) ∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗), (¬n−1ψ)∗ ⊢(n,k) θ
n) ∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−1ψ)∗), (¬nψ)∗ ⊢(n,k)) θ
n+ 1) ∆, ¬ψ ∧ ψ, (¬ψ)◦ ⊢(n,k) θ
n+ 2) ∆, ¬ψ ∧ ψ, ¬2ψ ∧ ¬ψ, (¬2ψ)◦ ⊢(n,k) θ
...
...
n+ k − 1) ∆, ¬ψ ∧ ψ, . . . , ¬k−1ψ ∧ ¬k−2ψ, (¬k−1ψ)◦ ⊢(n,k) θ
n+ k) ∆,¬ψ ∧ ψ, . . . ,¬kψ ∧ ¬k−1ψ, (¬kψ)◦ ⊢(n,k) θ
n+ k + 1) ∆,∼ ψ, ψ∗ ⊢(n,k) θ
n+ k + 2) ∆, c©ψ, ψ◦ ⊢(n,k) θ
n+ k + 3) ⊢(n,k) θ
∗
n+ k + 4) ⊢(n,k) θ
◦
Then it is valid that ∆ ⊢(n,k) θ.
Proof: First, by Hypothesis 1) to n) can be obtained ∆,¬(ψ∗) ⊢(n,k) θ (⋆).
Indeed: by n − 1), ∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k) (¬
n−1ψ)∗ → θ. Besides
that, it holds that ⊢(n,k) ((¬
n−1ψ)∗)∗ (by Prop. 3.6), and ⊢ θ◦ (by Hypothesis
n+k+4)). Applying all this to Prop. 3.8.d) it is verified:
∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k) ¬θ → ¬((¬
n−1ψ)∗) (†).
It is also valid ∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k)) ¬((¬
n−1ψ)∗) → θ, because
Ax5, n) and DT. In addition, ⊢(n,k) (¬((¬
n−1ψ)∗))∗ , because Proposition 3.6
and Ax11. Thus, considering Prop. 3.8.d) and Hyp. n+k+4) again, it holds:
∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k) ¬θ → ¬
2((¬n−1ψ)∗) (††).
Hence, from (†) and (††) and Corollary 3.12.d):
∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢ ¬θ → [¬2((¬n−1ψ)∗) ∧ ¬((¬n−1ψ)∗)] (✸).
On the other hand, it holds ⊢(n,k) (¬θ)
∗, because Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax11. And,
of course, ⊢(n,k) [¬
2((¬n−1ψ)∗) ∧ ¬((¬n−1ψ)∗)]◦. So, by Proposition 3.8.d):
∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k) ¬[¬
2((¬n−1ψ)∗)∧¬((¬n−1ψ)∗)]→ ¬¬θ. That
is, ∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k) (¬((¬
n−1ψ)∗))◦ → ¬¬θ. Thus, from Prop.
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3.13.i), ∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k) ¬¬θ. Thus (by Hyp. n+k+3) and
Ax9), ∆,¬(ψ∗), . . . ,¬((¬n−2ψ)∗) ⊢(n,k) θ (✸✸).
The procedure used above to prove (✸✸) can be applied using (in decreasing
order) the Hypotheses 1) ... n − 1), proving (⋆) (note that the formula ¬(ψ∗)
cannot be “suppressed” yet).
From (⋆) (and monotonicity), ∆,∼ ψ ⊢ ¬(ψ∗) → θ. Moreover, from Hyp.
n+ k + 1), it holds ∆,∼ ψ ⊢ ψ∗ → θ. From these facts and Corollary 3.12.c),
it is valid ∆,∼ ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬(ψ
∗) ∨ ψ∗ → θ. Now realizing that ⊢(n,k) ¬(ψ
∗) ∨ ψ∗
(because Prop. 3.6), it is obtained ∆,∼ ψ ⊢(n,k) θ. (I).
On the other hand, from n+1) to n+k) it is valid ∆, ψ∧¬ψ ⊢(n,k) θ (⋆⋆). The
reasoning is as follows: using n+ k) and Ax6, it holds:
∆,¬ψ ∧ ψ, . . . , ¬k−1ψ ∧ ¬k−2ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬
kψ ∧ ¬k−1ψ → θ. It is also valid
∆,¬ψ ∧ ψ, . . . ,¬k−1ψ ∧ ¬k−2ψ ⊢(n,k) (¬
k−1ψ)◦ → θ, because Hyp. n+ k − 1).
Hence, by Corollary 3.12.c) and recalling Definition 3.1:
∆, . . . , ¬k−1ψ ∧ ¬k−2ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬(¬
kψ ∧ ¬k−1ψ) ∨ (¬kψ ∧ ¬k−1ψ) → θ. That
is, ∆, . . . , ¬k−1ψ ∧ ¬k−2ψ ⊢(n,k) (¬
kψ ∧ ¬k−1ψ)∗ → θ. In addition, it holds
⊢(n,k) (¬
k−1ψ ∧¬kψ)∗, by Definition 3.1, Ax3 and Ax11. From these two facts,
it holds ∆, . . . , ¬k−2ψ ∧ ¬k−1ψ ⊢(n,k) θ. (✸✸✸)
Adapting the reasoning applied in (✸✸✸) to the Hypotheses n+k−2), . . . , n+1)
(in a decreasing order, as before), it is obtained (⋆⋆), as desired.
From (⋆⋆) and monotonicity it is valid ∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬ψ ∧ ψ → θ. So (by
Hyp. n+k+4), Prop. 3.6, Ax11 and Prop. 3.8.d)), ∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬θ → ψ
◦.
On the other hand, by Hyp. n + k + 2), it holds ∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) ψ
◦ → θ. So,
∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬θ → ¬(ψ
◦) (again, by Hyp. n+k+4), Prop. 3.6, Ax11 and Prop.
3.8.d)). Thus, ∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬θ → (¬(ψ
◦)∧ψ◦), by Corollary 3.12.d). Therefore,
∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬(¬(ψ
◦) ∧ ψ◦) → ¬¬θ (because Hyp. n+k+3), Ax11 and Prop.
3.8.d)) . That is, ∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) (ψ
◦)◦ → ¬¬θ. Hence, ∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) ¬¬θ,
because Prop. 3.13.c). Now, taking into account Hyp. n+k+3) and Ax9, it is
valid ∆, c©ψ ⊢(n,k) θ. (II).
From (I), (II) and Corollary 3.12.c), is verified ∆ ⊢(n,k) ( c©ψ)
∗ → θ. Hence, it
is valid ∆ ⊢(n,k) θ, by Prop 3.6. ✷
Thus, using Lemmas 4.3 and 4.4 it is possible to demonstrate (weak) complete-
ness as the following result shows:
Theorem 4.5 [Weak Completeness] |=(n,k) φ implies ⊢(n,k) φ.
Proof: Suppose |=(n,k) φ, with φ= φ[α1, . . . , αm], and consider the set V ALφ :=
{vt}1≤t≤(n+k+2)m (the set of all the I
nP k-valuations effectively used to evalu-
ate φ). Define in V ALφ the equivalence relation ≡1, as follows: for every
vt1 , vt2 ∈ V ALφ, vt1 ≡1 vt2 iff, for every αp with 2 ≤ p ≤ m, vt1(αp) = vt2(αp).
This relation has (n + k + 2)m−1 equivalence classes (indicated, in a general
way, by ||v||). Besides that, taking into account Definition 4.2, it holds that
(given a fixed equivalence class ||v||) Q
vt1
p = Q
vt2
p , for every 2 ≤ p ≤ m, for
every pair vt1 , vt2 ∈ ||v||. This allows to define the set ∆
||v||
1 := Q
vt
2 ∪ · · · ∪Q
vt
m,
being vt any element of ||v||. In addition, note that every class ||v|| has exactly
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(n+k+2) valuations and verifies that, for every vt1 , vt2 ∈ ||v||, vt1 6= vt2 implies
vt1(α1) 6= vt2(α1). Finally, note that, since |=(n,k) φ, for every v ∈ V ALφ, φ
v
= φ. All these facts (together with Lemma 4.3) imply that (for every ||v||) the
following formal proofs can be built:
1) ∆
||v||
1 ,¬(α
∗
1), (¬α1)
∗ ⊢(n,k) φ
1.2) ∆
||v||
1 ,¬(α
∗
1),¬((¬α1)
∗), (¬2α1)∗ ⊢(n,k) φ
...
...
1.n) ∆
||v||
1 ,¬(α
∗
1), . . . ,¬((¬
n−1α1)
∗), (¬nα1)∗ ⊢(n,k)) φ
1.(n+ 1)) ∆
||v||
1 , α1 ∧ ¬α1, (¬α1)
◦ ⊢(n,k) φ
1.n+ 2)) ∆
||v||
1 , α1 ∧ ¬α1, ¬
2α1 ∧ ¬α1, (¬2α1)◦ ⊢(n,k) φ
...
...
1.(n+ k)) ∆
||v||
1 , ¬α1 ∧ α1, . . . , ¬
kα1 ∧ ¬k−1α1, (¬kα1)◦ ⊢(n,k) φ
1.(n+ k + 1)) ∆
||v||
1 ,∼ α1, α
∗
1 ⊢(n,k) φ
1.(n+ k + 2)) ∆
||v||
1 , c©α1, α
◦
1 ⊢(n,k) φ
Moreover, by Proposition 3.7, it is valid:
1.(n+ k + 3)) ∆
||v||
1 ⊢(n,k) φ
∗
1.(n+ k + 4)) ∆
||v||
1 ⊢(n,k) φ
◦
All the previous facts allow to apply Lemma 4.4 in such a way that for every
||v|| it holds ∆
||v||
1 ⊢(n,k) φ (there are (n+ k+ 2)
m−1 formal proof of this type).
That is, it is possible “to eliminate” any referrence to formulas of the form αv1
in every formal proof obtained, by means of an adequate subdivision of the set
V ALφ, and by the application of Lemma 4.4. Note here that this process can
be applied one more time, reagrouping the formal proofs already obtained. So,
by a new application of Lemma 4.4 and of Proposition 3.7, any referrence to
formulas of the form αv2 can be supressed. The same prodedure can be applied
by a finite number of times, until obtaining the following formal proofs:
m.1) ¬(α∗m), (¬αm)
∗ ⊢(n,k) φ
m.2) ¬(α∗m),¬((¬αm)
∗), (¬2αm)∗ ⊢(n,k) φ
...
...
m.n) ¬(α∗m), . . . ,¬((¬
n−1αm)
∗), (¬nαm)∗ ⊢(n,k)) φ
m.(n+ 1)) ¬αm ∧ αm, (¬αm)◦ ⊢(n,k) φ
m.(n+ 2)) ¬αm ∧ αm, ¬2αm ∧ ¬αm, (¬2αm)◦ ⊢(n,k) φ
...
...
m.(n+ k)) ¬αm ∧ αm, . . . ,¬kαm ∧ ¬k−1αm, (¬kαm)◦ ⊢(n,k) φ
m.(n+ k + 1)) ∼ αm, α∗m ⊢(n,k) φ
m.(n+ k + 2)) c©αm, α
◦
m ⊢(n,k) φ
m.(n+ k + 3)) ⊢(n,k) φ
∗
m.(n+ k + 4)) ⊢(n,k) φ
◦
Applying Lemma 4.4 and Proposition 3.7 for a last time, ⊢(n,k) φ. ✷
Note that, in the proof developed above, all the (n+ k + 2)
m
valuations of
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V ALφ are needed to obtain the formal proofs that allow to demonstrate ⊢(n,k) φ.
Theorems 4.1 and 4.5 prove weak adequacity: |=(n,k) φ iff ⊢(n,k) φ. This result
can be improved:
Theorem 4.6 [Strong Adequacity]: for every Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ L(C), Γ |=(n,k) φ iff
Γ ⊢(n,k) φ.
Proof: By Proposition 2.10, |=(n,k) verifies Semantics Deduction Theorem and
is finitary. Moreover, by the definition of formal proof used in this paper, ⊢(n,k)
is finitary, and (by Theorem 3.4) it verifies Sintactic Deduction Theorem, as
was already mentioned. From all this facts, and taking into account that both
|=(n,k) and ⊢(n,k) are monotonic, strong adequacity is demonstrated. ✷
5 Concluding remarks
Despite its interest as a general result (for a countable, non-lineal family of
logics), the adequate axiomatics shown here can be applied in different ways.
First of all, a natural problem to be solved is the independence of the axiomatics
presented here and it is part of a future work.
On the other hand, another of the possible uses of this axiomatics is the study
of algebraizability of the InP k-logics. It is worth to comment here that I1P 0 is
algebraizable (see [12]), as in the case of I0P 1 (this fact was already indicated).
Moreover, in [5] it was demonstrated that all the logics of InPk are algebraizable.
So, the properties of the class of algebras associated to each InP k-logic deserve
to be investigated. By the way, the class of algebras associated to I0P 1 was
already studied in [7] and in [9]. In both works, the axiomatics obtained for this
logic are very useful for the study of the so-called class of P 1-algebras. This is
because there is a connection between the axiomatics of an algebraizable logic
and its equivalent algebraic semantics, cf. [1]. As a generalization of this fact,
the axiomatics shown here would allow to study the different classes of (say)
InP k-algebras in a more efficient way.
Finally, note this fact about the complexity of the formulas: given a fixed logic
InP k, every formula φ ∈ L(C) with complexity Comp(φ) ≥ max{n, k} behaves
“in a classical way” (this fact is related to the inclusion of Ax5 and Ax6 in the
axiomatics presented in this paper). This would suggest to define a special kind
of logics: the family SC of “stationary classically logics”. Obviously, InPk would
be a particular subclass of SC. The study of the latter class deserves special
attention in a future research.
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